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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act' is a remarkable piece of
legislation. It is a highly accessible statutory framework both from a
linguistic and organizational standpoint. The 1996 Act represents a
substantial improvement over prior English arbitration statutes, including
the 1979 Act.2 The new legislation is comprehensive, thorough, cogent
* Professor of Law, Tulane University; B.A. Bowdoin College; J.D., M.A., University
of Virginia; M.A. Oxford University; LL.M., J.S.D., Columbia University. Professor Carbonneau
also is the Editor in Chief of the World Arbitration and Mediation Report.
1. United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23.
2. United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1979.
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and coherent. In its presentation and content, it easily rivals both
longstanding and recent legislative enactments on arbitration. It is built
upon a wealth of knowledge and expertise of arbitration law and practice,
and embodies a very contemporary and integrated concept of arbitration.
The content of the 1996 Act intermediates effectively between legal
regulatory principles and the practical realities of the arbitral process. The
statutory provisions read as a hybrid of standard legislative enactments
and institutional rules on arbitration. The fundamental precepts of the
"world law" on arbitration-party autonomy, the validity of arbitration
agreements, judicial assistance and cooperation, limited scrutiny of
awards, the requirement of basic procedural fairness, and the need for
finality and arbitral autonomy-are everywhere present in the statutory
provisions. These principles are not new to English arbitration law, but
the clarity of the codification and the cohesion of expression in the 1996
Act give them new vitality and a stronger presence.
Notwithstanding its substantial quality, the 1996 Act does not
achieve absolute perfection. For example, it retains a version of the right
of judicial appeal of the merits of arbitral awards and a restricted right of
appeal on questions of law during the proceeding. For good or ill,
England remains one of the few national jurisdictions that allows judicial
supervision of arbitration on the merits. Moreover, the statute is less
limpid about the place and standing of international commercial
arbitration within its regulatory scheme. It still employs a nationality-
based definition of international or nondomestic arbitration and allows
"exclusion agreements" as long as the New York Arbitration Convention3
or other treaties do not govern enforcement. The treatment of
international arbitration is less unified and suffers from the complication
of internal and external cross-references. These attributes bring confusion
rather than clarity to the regulation of the subject area. Given the
significance of London as an international center for maritime and other
forms of commercial arbitration, a more transparent set of regulatory
provisions would have been useful.
The 1996 Act is unquestionably comprehensive. Its content,
organized according to standard headings, mirrors the logical progression
of the arbitral proceeding and consists of 110 provisions that regulate the
various stages of the arbitral process and the relationship that exists
between that process, the legal system, and the right of contract. Despite
3. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.NT.S. 3.
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their number, the rules never submerge the essential regulatory
perspective and objective. The rules are linked, consistent, and respond to
a uniform regulatory philosophy. This commentary endeavors to
highlight and appraise the most significant aspects of the 1996 Act.
H. BASIC PRINCIPLES
Section 1 of the Act describes the basic principles that underlie the
statute and its regulation of arbitration. It is an exceedingly important and
useful provision in that it makes clear both the regulatory objectives of the
statute and the policy of promoting the privatization of adjudication
through arbitration.
Section l(a) defines the recourse to arbitration as a means of
adjudicating claims in a fair and impartial manner without incurring the
expense and time commitment required by judicial litigation. The
purpose of arbitration, therefore, is to achieve efficiency in the resolution
of disputes. Referring matters to arbitration involves an acceptance of an
abbreviated and more expeditious process, but not an abandonment of
fundamental procedural fairness. Comparatively uncomplicated but
basically fair adjudicatory procedures are the essence of the bargain for
arbitration and characterize the underlying adjudicatory rationale of the
process.
Section l(b) announces the principle of party autonomy and
provides for its nearly unrestricted scope of application. As a matter of
law, the parties have the legal right to choose the means by which to
resolve their disputes. The exercise of this right is subject "only" to the
limitations that arise from those "safeguards" that "are necessary in the
public interest."4 The notion of "safeguarding the public interest" can be
interpreted widely, but given the syntactical position of these phrases and
the qualification "only," it likely refers exclusively to matters of substance
and procedure that are vital to the integrity of the legal system and
fundamental social interests. Certainly the external, noncontractual
constraints on arbitration would include compliance with the
requirements of basic adjudicatory fairness in terms of procedure.5
Whether the notion of "safeguards" demands arbitral compliance
with a court-imposed standard for the application of substantive law rules
is unclear. The possible recourse to the courts on preliminary questions of
4. United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § l(b).
5. See id. § 68(2) (providing an illustrative list of events that constitute "serious
[procedural] irregularity").
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law6 and the right of appeal on a point of law7 appear to integrate
substantive law safeguards into the statutory standard. Both actions,
however, can be excluded by party agreement and are subject to a number
of restrictions, making it unlikely that they could be used to preempt the
reference to arbitration.
Whether section l(b) might be construed as containing a
substantive inarbitrability defense is also a matter of speculation. As
noted at the end of this commentary, the 1996 Act does not expressly
address the question of subject matter inarbitrability. Sections 89-91
indicate that the validity of an arbitration agreement can be challenged for
reasons of unfairness or over-reaching in the context of consumer
transactions. "[Safeguarding] ... the public interest,"8 then, might
involve placing subject matter restraints on the recourse to arbitration, like
the "unfair terms regulations in consumer arbitration agreements" 9 or
through limitations articulated on a statute-by-statute basis. While it
might contain some subject matter limits on arbitration, section 1(b)
nonetheless consecrates the right of contractual recourse to nonjudicial
remedies and procedures.
Section 1(c) reinforces the principle of arbitral autonomy and
contractual freedom. It provides that judicial intervention in arbitration
can only take place when it is specifically authorized by statute. As a
matter of statutory policy, judicial activism in regard to arbitration or
open-ended scrutiny of arbitration agreements and awards is excluded.
The courts must have an express statutory basis for questioning the
recourse to arbitration or the results of the arbitral process.
III. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION TO ASSIST ARBITRATION
Under section 1, a statutory policy favoring arbitration and the
deregulation of arbitration emerges. Arbitration provides parties with a
cheaper and less involved means of resolving disputes. The section
emphasizes that parties have a basic right to pursue remedies outside of
judicial adjudication, provided such recourse does not infringe upon vital
social policies and compromise the fairness that is essential to the
legitimacy of adjudicatory processes. Finally, the law must allow
arbitration to operate independently of the courts. This limitation of
6. See id. § 45.
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judicial supervision is necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the
arbitral remedy.
From an international perspective, section 2 of the Act contains a
number of significant provisions. It endorses the basic premise of
"anational" arbitration by giving extraterritorial reach to English court
jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings, benefiting the operation of
transborder arbitrations. Under the legislation, English courts can assist
arbitral proceedings that are not located in the United Kingdom or that
have yet to be localized in a particular national jurisdiction. An order to
stay judicial proceedings'0 or to compel the appearance of witnesses,1
among other judicial rulings, can be indispensable to the operation of an
international arbitration. The statute thereby makes the benefits of the lex
loci arbitri available to arbitrating parties "for the purpose of supporting
the arbitral process."' 2
Under section 2(3), courts may decline to use some of these powers
when they determine that the localization of the arbitration abroad would
make the intervention of an English court "inappropriate." Conversely,
English courts may use their general judicial powers under the statute to
assist an arbitral proceeding that has not been localized in any jurisdiction
and has "a connection" with the United Kingdom where the court deems
its assistance to be "appropriate.' 3 Finally, certain provisions of the
statute relating to the separability of the arbitration agreement and the
effect of the death of a party are applicable to a nonlocalized arbitration or
one with a seat outside of the United Kingdom if English law governs the
arbitration agreement.
14
IV. HIERARCHY OF AuTmoRrrY
Section 3, which defines the term "seat of the arbitration," is also
instructive on the question of controlling authority in matters of
arbitration. The provision establishes a hierarchy of sources for
determining the seat of the arbitration and presumably for determining
other issues that might arise in arbitration. The statute gives the principle
of party autonomy primacy as a source of controlling authority. While the
wisdom of this delegation of regulatory authority to contract and the
privatization that it entails can be questioned, there is no doubt that it
10. See idi § 9.
11. Seeid §43.
12. Id § 2(4).
13. See id § 2(4).
14. See id § 2(5).
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aligns the English legislation with the consensus approach to the
regulation of arbitration. Through their contract of arbitration, the parties
can supply the fundamental rules of the process. The right of contractual
freedom is limited only by what the statute deems are its "mandatory
provisions,"' 5 but these provisions foster the recourse to and the
functionality and finality of arbitration. The exercise of contractual
freedom, therefore, is basically unfettered and constitutes (with the
support of the statute and of the enacting state) the basic means for
regulating the arbitral process.
When the parties do not exercise their contractual prerogatives,
institutional processes or agents to whom the parties have delegated their
rule- or decision-making authority can establish the perimeters of the
arbitration. The English statute thereby continues to recognize the central
significance of contract provisions to the regulation of arbitration and also
acknowledges the vital role that supervisory institutions play in the
arbitration process. When the institutional apparatus fails to supply the
necessary predicate of decision, the arbitral tribunal can decide the matter,
if the parties have authorized it to do so, or a court can resolve the matter
in light of the parties agreement and the circumstances of the transaction.
V. THE REQUIREMENT OF A WRITING
Section 5 pertains to the "in-writing" requirement and contains a
very flexible definition of that requirement. For example, the writing
need not be signed by the parties; it need only be "evidenced" in writing
and can be made indirectly by reference to written-terms. It also can be
presumed to exist if its material existence goes uncontested in
adjudicatory proceedings. The English statute adopts and improves
considerably upon the New York Arbitration Convention's liberal
definition of the "in-writing" requirement. It adds to the implementation
of the requirement the considerable practical experience that accounts in
detail for the circumstances of commercial transactions. It does not go as
far as allowing courts to imply an arbitration agreement in a commercial
setting where such agreements are commonplace, but it does lessen
substantially the legal formalities ordinarily associated with the "in
writing" requirement. Needless to say, the provision is intended to be
supportive of the commercial recourse to arbitration.
15. Id. § 4(1); see also id. sched. 1.
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VI. THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
The definition of arbitration agreements in section 6 exhibits the
clarity and concision which is characteristic of the statute's provisions.
The language and content of the statute are very clear and generally do
not create problems in interpreting their meaning or underlying policy.
Section 7 incorporates the separability doctrine into the statutory
framework, with the proviso that its application can be defeated by party
agreement to the contrary. The separability doctrine is part of all major
modem legislative enactments on arbitration and is instrumental to
jurisdictional issues that can arise in arbitration and to the autonomy of
the arbitral process. The failure to incorporate expressly the separability
doctrine into the statute would have constituted a significant lacuna in the
legislation, making it a much less vital and adapted regulatory framework.
VII. STAYING LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Section 9 elaborates rules regulating a stay of legal proceedings. It
contains provisions that codify the standard principles of international
arbitration law on this matter, for example: mandating judicial
cooperation with the arbitral process, recognizing the jurisdictional effect
and remedial exclusivity of an arbitration agreement, and providing for a
contractual defense to the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. This
section also contains an innovative feature. The application for a stay
cannot be defeated by the fact that the reference to arbitration is part of a
larger dispute resolution clause that conditions the recourse to arbitration
upon the "exhaustion of other dispute resolution procedures."' 16 The
acknowledgement that the reference to arbitration can be part of a more
complex provision for alternative or nonjudicial dispute resolution aligns
the statute with contemporary contracting practices.
It is now relatively commonplace to bargain for "staggered" or
"multi-leveled" dispute resolution provisions in which the parties agree to
engage in some form of structured negotiations, conciliation, or mediation
before they have recourse to an adjudicatory remedy, namely, the arbitral
procedure. The English legislation, in effect, recognizes this practice
and-at least impliedly-legitimates it by providing that it cannot block
the eventual reference to arbitration. Whether the court can coerce party
participation in these preliminary procedures-i.e., whether the governing
and coercive authority of the arbitration statute extends to nonarbitral
16. Id. § 9(2).
1997l
TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL
alternative remedies-is left unresolved by the statute. Nonetheless, the
statute attributes significant importance to this practice and its impact
upon arbitration; it refers to the coexistence of arbitration and other
nonjudicial remedies in at least four other provisions. 7
Furthermore, section 9, along with section 10(2), contains a novel
procedural refinement that indicates, once more, that the English statute is
built upon an expert acquaintance with arbitral practice and the problems
that can attend it. The provision states that the denial of a stay remains
effective even when the arbitration agreement provides that the rendition
of an award is a condition precedent to the filing of a court action. To
maintain the exclusive reference to arbitration, parties sometimes provide
in their agreement that court action cannot be invoked except for purposes
of enforcement of the award. In this setting, even requesting that a court
enforce an interim award can be viewed as a betrayal of the agreement.
Despite such a contractual provision and party intent, the statute
preserves the court's authority to determine whether there is a proper legal
basis for the reference to arbitration. The parties can stipulate that
arbitration is their exclusive adjudicatory remedy and court intervention is
limited to the supervision of the award. A court determination, however,
that the reference to arbitration is legally invalid cannot be defeated by
party stipulation. At a policy level, the statute thereby establishes a basic
practical balance between the exercise of legal authority and party
autonomy.
VIII. MVARITIME ARBITRATION
Section 11 addresses an essential aspect of maritime arbitration: the
provision of security in maritime arbitral proceedings.18 The rules dealing
with the effect of a stay upon the provision of security are clearly
articulated and grounded in common sense and in a cooperative attitude
between the judiciary and the arbitral process. The express reference to
maritime arbitration is the distinctive aspect of the provision. It is rare for
regulatory frameworks on arbitration to single out particular forms of
arbitration and elaborate specific rules for their operation. Maritime
arbitration unquestionably constitutes a large portion of the arbitration
business in London. The specific reference to maritime arbitration points
to the statute's innovative character and its focus upon the realities of
17. See id. §§ 12(1)(b), 51(2), 56(4), 70(2)(a).
18. The new German law on arbitration, which came into effect on January 1, 1998, also
contains an express inference to maritime arbitration. See § 1031(4) ZPO.
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arbitral practice as well as its objective to provide for a meaningful and
practical legal regulation of the arbitral process.
IX. TIME LIBiTS
Section 12 addresses the topic of time extensions and gives the
courts discretion in exceptional circumstances to salvage the recourse to
arbitration despite the tolling of an agreed-upon time limit. The statute, in
effect, bends the principle of contractual control of arbitration in situations
of inadvertence or in circumstances that involve the failure to comply
with technical requirements. Where a party fails to act in a timely fashion
upon its right to arbitrate, the court can extend the time limit for
arbitration when the delay could not reasonably be anticipated or the other
party took advantage of the circumstances. The remedial authority of the
court ostensibly is intended to relieve inequity; its practical effect is to
sustain the reference to arbitration despite nonconformity with agreed-
upon terms. This form of judicial assistance represents a departure from
the contractualist view of arbitration that has become so popular in the
United States. It introduces less predictable equitable considerations into
the enforcement of arbitration agreements, which can have the
consequence of disturbing the implementation of the parties' intent. The
circumstances of application, however, are narrow and involve the
dislodging of contractual terms that are relatively uncommon in standard
provisions for arbitration. Moreover, the court's authority only applies to
deficiencies in implementing an arbitral clause in which the passage of
time leads to unpredictable circumstances or to a greater likelihood of
party noncompliance. Finally, under section 12(4), the court has wide
discretion to remedy the situation as it deems fit.
X. THE ARBrTRAL TRIBUNAL
Section 15 deals with the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. It
recognizes the controlling authority of the party autonomy principle by
stating that the parties "are free to agree on the number of arbitrators ...
and whether there is to be a chairman or umpire.' 9 Paragraph 2 contains,
subject to party agreement, the standard fail-safe device against a
deadlock, providing that the designation of an even number of arbitrators
by the parties presumes the appointment of an additional arbitrator.
Paragraph 3 contains the additional presumption that a lack of agreement
19. See United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 15(1). The role and function of
the umpire is described in detail in section 21.
1997]
TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL
on the number of arbitrators means that that there shall be a sole
arbitrator.20 These rules are part of the standard regulatory fare on
arbitration and are intended to promote the functionality of the arbitral
process.
The reference to the appointment of an umpire is not usually a part
of national arbitral regulation. It represents a special feature of English
arbitration, more particularly, of maritime arbitrations conducted in
London. In order to expedite arbitral proceedings and to make them less
costly, maritime parties sometimes only appoint two party-designated
arbitrators to the arbitral tribunal. The parties assume that these experts
can come to a unitary resolution of the dispute by way of their technical
expertise. In the event of a deadlock, the arbitrators, the parties, a
supervising agency, or a court can name an umpire to assist the party-
designated arbitrators in overcoming their decisional impasse or to decide
the dispute. The Act's provision regarding the umpire may have the
effect of generalizing it as an arbitral practice and encouraging expedited
and more economical arbitrations.
XI. THE ARBITRAL PROCESS
Both sections 14 and 16, along with several others,2' illustrate the
central significance that the statute attaches to the party autonomy
principle. As to both the commencement of the arbitral proceedings and
the appointment of arbitrators, party disposition and intent control. In
these and many other arbitral matters, the statutory regulations have a
default and gap-filling role. When the arbitration agreement is silent and
a problem surfaces, the statute establishes a procedure or a set of rules that
allows the parties to express their mutual agreement on the resolution of
the matter or to invoke a substitute mechanism by which to preserve the
reference to arbitration and to maintain the functionality of the arbitral
remedy. 22 The rules are sufficiently extensive to cover the problems that
are likely to arise in arbitral practice, once again demonstrating the depth
of doctrinal and practical knowledge upon which the statute is founded.
Throughout these sections, court intervention is restricted to
resolving the problems that impede the functioning of the arbitral
process.23 Once a solution is reached, further judicial intervention is
20. Section 17 describes the role and function of sole arbitrators and the circumstances of
their appointment.
21. See United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, §§ 15, 18,20, 23, 25.
22. See id. §§ 14-25.
23. See id. §§ 18(2)-(3), 19, 23(5), 24, 25(4).
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minimized by the "leave to appeal" procedure, under which the court
must give the parties permission to lodge their appeal.24 For the last
several years, the standard practice of English courts has been to grant
"leave" only when the question raises a significant issue of law. The
statute affirms that practice. The guiding or core principles of the
statutory regulation are clear. First, the parties have the right-perhaps
even the responsibility-to establish rules for the operation of their
arbitration. Second, when the parties have failed to make the necessary
provisions, the law provides them with an opportunity to exercise their
mutual intent once problematic circumstances arise.25 Third, if judicial
intervention is necessary, it shall provide an expedient remedy that
converges with the parties' agreement to arbitrate and the circumstances
of their transaction, maintains the integrity of and gives effect to the
arbitral process, and preserves the efficiency and functionality of
arbitration.26
The statute comprehensively treats the various stages of the arbitral
process and the procedural problems that can arise in these settings.27 The
statute also gives the payment of and liability for arbitrator fees and
arbitral costs a relatively important place in the regulatory framework.28
This type of attention is somewhat unusual in a national law of
arbitration. It appears more commonly in institutional rules of arbitration.
The consideration of this subject matter reveals that the statute is intended
to be a highly functional law of arbitration that effectively addresses the
central administrative details of the arbitral process. As noted earlier, the
statute effectively intermediates between the traditional statement of
statutory rules and principles and the standard provisions of institutional
rules on arbitration. This characteristic of the statute accounts for its
length, comprehensiveness, innovative character, and exemplary appeal.
Finally, it establishes that the arbitrating parties are jointly and severally
liable for the payment of fees and expenses.2
24. See id. §§ 17(4), 18(5), 21(6), 24(6), 25(5).
25. See id. §§ 14-25.
26. See, e.g., id. §§ 18, 24.
27. These procedural problems can include death (section 26), disqualification (section
24), or resignation of an arbitrator (section 24), the filling of vacancies (section 27), and the like.
28. See United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 28.
29. See id Section 28, which addresses the payment of arbitrator fees and expenses, is
aligned with section 49 (on calculation of interest), section 56 (on withholding the award for non-
payment), and sections 59-65 (on the costs of arbitration).
19971
TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL
XII. ARBITRATOR LIABILrrY
On the question of arbitrator liability for the performance of
adjudicatory tasks, section 29 of the statute adopts a rule of general
immunity except .for conduct that amounts to bad faith.3°  It also
incorporates a vicarious liability principle, making arbitrators liable for
the bad faith conduct of their agents or employees. Paragraph 3
coordinates the general liability rule with the more complex provision for
arbitrator liability in the event of resignation under section 25.
The bad faith rule is one of several standard positions on the
question of arbitrator malpractice. Other jurisdictions, like France, hold
arbitrators liable on a general contractual basis, while some, such as the
United States, attribute a nearly absolute, judge-like immunity to
arbitrators. A number of institutional rules also address the question and
generally provide for complete arbitrator immunity from malpractice
liability. Given the nature of adjudication and the need for arbitral
autonomy and impartiality, it is difficult to see how a rule of ordinary
professional liability could be integrated into the effective functioning of
the arbitral process.
There is a great deal of wisdom to the English rule in that it strikes a
workable balance between the need for some level of professional
accountability and the need to maintain the integrity of the arbitral
adjudicatory function. The statute, however, leaves the critical question
of determining what constitutes arbitrator bad faith conduct unresolved.
Once the general principle is established, the drafters may have thought it
better to let the courts and the case law deal with that difficult and highly
circumstantial issue.
XIII. KOMPETENZ-KOMPETENZ
Section 30 codifies the kompetenz-kompetenz doctrine. As with the
other provisions of the statute, the codification is remarkably terse and
clear; the substantive architecture of the rule is comprehensive and
cohesive. The recognition of the arbitrators' authority to rule on
jurisdictional challenges is a basic feature of all modem legislative
enactments on arbitration. Unlike other national statutes, the English
legislation identifies three (rather than two) grounds for contesting the
adjudicatory authority of arbitrators.3  To the invalidity or inadequate
30. The content of section 29 is coordinated with section 74, dealing with the immunity
of arbitral institutions.
31. See United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 30(1).
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scope of the arbitration agreement, it adds the ground of improper
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. At first blush, it is difficult to see
what impact such a procedural irregularity might have upon what the
statute terms the "substantive jurisdiction" of the arbitral tribunal, or what
French law, for example, refers to as the basis for the arbitrators'
adjudicatory investiture. Upon reflection, however, the three grounds
appear to be equivalent in that they are all traditionally listed (without any
evaluative distinction) in the means of recourse against the enforcement
of arbitral awards. Moreover, the proper constitution of the arbitral
tribunal (presumably, pursuant to the dictates of the arbitration
agreement), if done deficiently, is arguably as critical to the integrity of
the arbitration as an invalid arbitration agreement or one that lacks
sufficient scope. Under this expansive reasoning, however, any of the
standard grounds for opposing the enforcement of arbitral awards could
be given an equivalent weighting. Accordingly, the question arises as to
why the other grounds for challenging an award were not included as
falling under kompetenz-kompetenz authority.
The answer may reside in a development of practice. Parties may
have begun challenging the right of arbitrators to rule on the basis that the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal was flawed. This type of challenge,
therefore, may have created a need to determine whether the arbitrators or
the courts would have the "first look" at the objection when it was raised
at the outset of the arbitral proceedings. Be that as it may, the rule, as
articulated, unquestionably favors the autonomy of arbitration and, once
again, testifies to the statute's alignment with the realities of arbitral
practice and the contemporary developments in the field.
The impact of practice upon the statute is further in evidence in the
second paragraph of section 30. There, the statute provides for appeal
against the arbitrators' ruling on jurisdictional challenges, recognizing
that appeal can lie not only to a court, but also to "any available arbitral
process of appeal or review.' 3 2  It is now part of standard arbitral
practice-specifically recognized in the 1986 Netherlands Arbitration
Statute33 and, more recently, in Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI
Telecommunications Corp.,34 decided pursuant to the United States
Supreme Court precedent in First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan3 5-to allow
32. Id. § 30(2).
33. Netherlands Arbitration Statute § 1050,4 Civ. Proc. Code 1 (1986).
34. 62 F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995).
35. 514 U.S. 938, 942-45 (1995); see also LaPine Tech. v. Kyocera, 130 F3d 884 (9th
Cir. 1997).
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parties to provide for an internal arbitral appeal mechanism and/or to
provide for a form of review that raises or lowers the statutory or
decisional standard for judicial supervision. While the content of
section 30 aligns the statute with the modem developments of arbitral
practice, it leaves a number of questions unanswered.
First, given the general provisions of section 30, could the parties
exclude any review whatsoever of the arbitrators' rulings on jurisdictional
matters? In other words, does the recognition of party discretion to
establish a private means of review imply party discretion to achieve or
implement a negative? Does the general exclusion of all review give the
sitting arbitrators absolute authority in these matters? Second, would the
effective exclusion of review at this stage of the process also amount to an
exclusion of review on these grounds later for the enforcement of the
award (assuming English law governed the matter of enforcement)?
Third, more specifically, when provision is made for internal arbitral
review, does section 30(2) exclude a reference of arbitrator determinations
of jurisdictional matters to the courts? In other words, how does the
provision for internal arbitral review coexist with the supervisory
authority of the courts? Section 30(2) provides that any ruling by an
arbitral tribunal on its own substantive jurisdiction "may be challenged by
any available arbitral process of appeal or review or in accordance with
the provisions of this part."36 The use of "or" in the provision seems to
provide that procedures for internal arbitral review can dislodge the
judicial reference in these matters.
When there is recourse to the courts on an arbitrator's determination
of a jurisdictional matter, section 31 requires a party to raise its
jurisdictional objections in a timely fashion.37 Such challenges are meant
to constitute serious preliminary objections to arbitration and should be
evident early in the proceedings. They are not intended to function as
desperate eleventh-hour afterthoughts for a losing party. The statute gives
the arbitrators wide discretion to acknowledge and to rule upon such
claims. It conveys the clear impression that jurisdictional challenges
should not be used to disrupt the operation of the arbitration or become a
means of exercising dilatory tactics. Once the parties have agreed to
resolve their disputes through arbitration, they are bound by that
agreement and, unless there are true concerns with the legal validity of the
36. United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 30(2) (emphasis added).
37. See also id. § 73.
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instituted proceedings, the parties must cooperate and comply with the
implementation of the remedy.
Section 32, which outlines the framework for judicial supervision in
these circumstances, is in keeping with the intendment of the forgoing
provisions. Judicial intervention is warranted in exceptional circumstances,
essentially to assist the process in overcoming a substantial hurdle.
Paragraph 1, however, contains a facial contradiction with the right of
arbitrators to rule on jurisdictional challenges provided for in section 30.
It states that a "court may, on the application of... [an arbitrating] party
determine any question as to the substantive jurisdiction of the
tribunal. 38 Paragraph 2 clarifies the apparent contradiction by providing
that mutual party agreement or the acquiescence of the arbitral tribunal is
necessary in order for the court to rule on this basis. Moreover, even
when the arbitral tribunal acquiesces, the court can refuse to rule if it
believes its intervention is likely to have no useful practical impact upon
the arbitration, the request is made too late, or there is no "good reason"
for a court's determination of the matter. In other words, judicial
intervention can only take place if the parties agree or because judicial
assistance is indispensable to the proper functioning of the arbitration.
The statute places substantial reliance upon the sound discretion of the
court in exercising its supervisory powers and, in paragraph 6, limits
considerably the right of appeal from an initial court determination.
Leave to appeal can only be granted when "the court considers that the
question involves a point of law which is one of general importance or is
one which for some other special reason should be considered by the
Court of Appeal."39
The statute thereby codifies a version of kompetenz-kompetenz that
decidedly fosters the autonomous operation of the arbitral process. The
critical issues of kompetenz-kompetenz under English arbitration law no
longer are related to the timing of judicial review or to the question of
whether the arbitrators or the courts have the final say on the validity of
the arbitrators' adjudicatory authority. Assuming the parties do not
provide otherwise in their agreement, the statutory rules provide for
arbitrator determination of jurisdictional challenges with a very limited
possibility for judicial supervision of that determination. In fact, a party
provision for internal arbitral review appears to eliminate the prospect of
judicial intervention altogether. The rule is constructed to uphold the
38. Id. § 32(1).
39. Id § 32.
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reference to and operation of arbitration and to confine the exercise of
judicial power to instances that involve vital concerns, that reflect
fundamental abuse, or that would serve the necessary practical interests of
the process.
XIV. ARBITRAL DuE PROCESS
Section 33 has central significance in that it embodies the statute's
concept of the adjudicatory mission of the arbitrators and defines the due
process standard applicable to arbitral proceedings. The arbitral tribunal's
"general duty" in the conduct of the proceedings and in the performance
of its adjudicatory tasks is to "act fairly and impartially" and give each
party "a reasonable opportunity" to present its case and to respond to the
opponent.' Under section 68, the enforcement of an award can be
challenged on the basis of a "serious irregularity" of procedure. The
provision lists nine illustrative grounds or types of adjudicatory conduct
that constitute a "serious irregularity" of procedure. A court can deny
enforcement of an award on the enumerated basis if that adjudicatory
conduct would result in "substantial injustice" to a party. The great utility
of sections 33 and 68 is that they clearly establish what constitutes
inadequate arbitral due process and articulate the basic principle for
determining the legitimacy of arbitral proceedings and determinations: the
avoidance of "substantial injustice" to the party or parties.
Further under section 33, the objective of arbitral adjudication is "to
provide a fair means" for resolving the matters submitted, taking into
account considerations of time and expense as well as the special needs of
the particular case.4' It is rare for legislative enactments on arbitration to
provide such a concise and compelling description of the purpose and
rationale of arbitration. Most of them are preoccupied with elaborating
the traditional demarcations and distinctions between arbitration and the
legal process. As a result, they only imply a concept and understanding
of arbitration and sometimes generate confusion or become riddled with
legal formalities. There is no mistaking the English statute's intent to
regulate the arbitral process or the concept of arbitration that it embodies.
The purpose of arbitration is to provide parties with a procedural means
of achieving expedited and legitimate justice-specifically, among
merchant parties, to arrive at commercially-adapted results through a
40. IJ § 33(1)(a), (2). The procedural imperatives that apply to arbitral proceedings are
defined in greater detail in section 68, aligning it with section 33.
41. Id. § 33(1)(b).
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sound but unoppressive procedure. Once again, the statute intermediates
effectively between legislation and institutional rules on arbitration and
produces a regulatory vehicle which contains a set of sound, accurate, and
realistic provisions on arbitration.
XV. ARBITRATOR AOHORrrY
In regulating the conduct of arbitral proceedings, the statute shifts
away from its emphasis on party autonomy and restricting the supervisory
role of the courts. Instead, the statute focuses upon the procedural
authority of arbitrators and, in the main, gives them the primary right and
responsibility to conduct the arbitral proceeding.42 The statute thereby
appears to incorporate the view advanced by arbitral institutions and
followed in arbitral practice: through contract, the parties have the
exclusive right to initiate the arbitral process. Once the process is
initiated, however, the parties relinquish some of their power to the
process itself and its basic principles of operation. In order to provide for
reasonable, efficient, and expedited adjudication, the arbitrators must have
the authority to make critical procedural decisions. By agreeing to
arbitration, the parties acquiesce to the basic rationale of arbitration: they
must allow the arbitrators to preserve the functionality of the arbitral
mechanism.
Section 34(1) illustrates the point and provides: "It shall be for the
tribunal to decide all procedural and evidential matters, subject to the right
of the parties to agree on any matter. 4 3 The reversal of the usual
syntactical ordering of the phrase is significant. In most other provisions,
the statute first refers to the right of the parties to establish the applicable
rule by stating that "the parties are free to agree .. .," thereby giving
priority to the party autonomy principle in arbitration. But, in section
34(1), first reference is made to the authority of the arbitral tribunal,
thereby impliedly giving it priority in matters involving the conduct of the
arbitral trial, and a secondary, qualifying reference is made to the
authority of the parties to decide these matters. It is, therefore, clear that
the power and responsibility to conduct the arbitral proceeding
presumptively resides with the arbitrators, subject to the acquiescence of
the parties. The rule not only accords with accepted arbitral practice, but
also is grounded in common sense and coincides with the underlying
rationale for the recourse to arbitration.
42. See id. § 34.
43. Id. § 34(l).
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Section 34(2) then outlines the specific procedural powers that the
arbitral tribunal may exercise as a matter of law, subject to passive party
approval. The list is comprehensive and useful; it addresses the most
significant aspects of the procedural protocol for an arbitral hearing:
location, language, the filing of claims and defenses, the means of
supplying evidence, the presentation and evaluation of evidence, the
method of questioning witnesses, and time limits. Other provisions-
sections 37, 38, 39, and 41--describe other procedural powers the
tribunal may exercise, but give the principle of party autonomy its
customary primary status. These powers include: the payment of
security, the administration of oaths, the conservation of property, the
ordering of interim relief, and the right to rule in default proceedings. The
drafters of the statute made an important statement of policy when they
distinguished between, in effect, first and second level procedural powers
on the basis of the significance of the party autonomy principle. By
placing certain essential procedural powers at the outer limit of the
principle of party autonomy, the drafters implicitly incorporated into the
statute the view that the agreement to arbitrate, once made, presumes
some necessary restriction on the freedom of contract. The arbitral
process requires the surrender of some procedural prerogatives, unless the
parties intend to establish a remedial mechanism that can be threatened by
elementary procedural dysfunctionality.
XVI. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION
The statutory section on "arbitral proceedings" also contains
provisions on judicial supervision.' Most of these provisions can be
more aptly described as rules for the judicial assistance of the
proceedings. Sections 42, 43, and 44 list those instances or circumstances
in the arbitral procedure in which the compulsion of judicial authority
might be necessary to the effective functioning of an arbitral proceeding.
By and large, the parties have a contractual right to exclude judicial
reference in these matters and the statute makes clear that the intervention
of a court is meant to foster the reference to arbitration and not to be
antagonistic to the aims and operation of the arbitral process. The
contemplated relationship between the courts and the arbitral process is
distinctly complementary and cooperative, grounded in common sense
and practicality. Appeal from initial judicial relief is restricted by the
44. See id §§ 42-44, 69, 87.
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leave procedure.45 As a result, a court can compel compliance, for
example, with the peremptory orders of the arbitral tribunal, the request
for testimony and supply of documents by the arbitrating parties or third
parties, and the enforcement of interim awards for security or for the
taking, inspection, or preservation of evidence.
Section 45 is more controversial, perhaps less adaptive or modem,
and a more uniquely English provision for judicial supervision. It
establishes a basis for court intervention in arbitral proceedings on a
substantive law basis. In addition, section 69 contains a parallel rule for
application at the enforcement stage of the award. As stated earlier, the
rule in sections 45 and 69 continues the English tradition of the defunct
case-stated procedure or the limited right of appeal on questions of law to
the High Court established by the 1979 Arbitration Act.46 Under the
language of section 87 (conjoined by sections 99-104), the parties, it
appears, may exclude this form of judicial supervision by agreement in an
international arbitration through what has been known as an "exemption
agreement." The right of contractual exclusion is more restricted in a
domestic context. In matters of domestic arbitration, the exclusion of the
judicial determination of questions of law that arise during the arbitration,
either at the time they surface or at the stage of the enforcement of the
award, can be effective only if the exclusion agreement is "entered into
after the commencement of the arbitral proceedings" at a time when
mutual agreement may not be as likely.
47
The statute does place a number of restrictions on the provisions for
a judicial ruling on the law. If raised during the proceedings, the court
must be "satisfied [that the question of law] substantially affects the rights
of one or more of the parties."' Moreover, the application to the court
either must be "made with the agreement of all the other parties' '49 or
"with the permission of the tribunal."5° In the latter case, the court further
must be satisfied that the application was timely and that its ruling "is
likely to produce substantial savings in costs."'" Finally, party agreement
that the arbitral tribunal need not give reasons with the award amounts to
a waiver of the right to judicial supervision on this ground. Presumably,
the consequences would be the same in a domestic arbitration even
45. - See id §§ 42(5), 44(7).
46. See United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1979, ch. 42.
47. United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 87(1).
48. Id. § 69(3)(a).
49. Id. § 45(2)(a).
50. Id. § 45(2)(b).
51. Id.
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though the requirement of section 87 technically would not have been
satisfied.
Section 69 provides for similar restrictions on the judicial procedure
for substantive law supervision in the setting of enforcement. It adds a
few more limitations given that the question of substantive law viability
of the arbitral determination arises when that determination has already
been made by the arbitrators, at which stage the issue is whether
enforcement of the award should take place. Under section 69(3), the
court can grant a leave to appeal only if the arbitral tribunal was asked to
resolve the legal question, the tribunal's determination has a substantial
impact upon party rights, the arbitrators either reached a clearly erroneous
legal decision or their determination "is at least open to serious doubt"5
2
and involves a question "of general public importance,"53 and "despite the
agreement of the parties to resolve the matter by arbitration, it is just and
proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question."54
There are further restrictions in section 69, but they either restate the
content of section 45 or provide for the special circumstances of
enforcement. Finally, it would seem logical to assume that international
arbitral awards55 would not be subject to this form of review, but rather
would be enforceable under article V of the New York Arbitration
Convention.56
The statutory availability of substantive judicial supervision during
the proceedings or at the stage of enforcement, as noted earlier, reinforces
a unique feature of English arbitration law. In the name of arbitral
autonomy, most arbitration statutes exclude judicial second-guessing or
scrutiny on the merits. Although it reaffirms the unique English practice,
the 1996 Arbitration Act clearly modifies the underlying rationale for the
procedure. Distrust of arbitration-a belief that it is incapable of reaching
legal determinations and can only serve a fact-finding adjudicatory
function-no longer is the keynote motivation for the English practice.
The objective of substantive recourse to the courts is to provide the
consumers of arbitral services with a remedy in those exceptional
circumstances when an arbitral ruling on the merits would significantly
compromise the parties' rights, the legitimacy of the arbitral process, or
52. Id. § 69(3)(c)(ii).
53. Id
54. Id § 69(3)(d).
55. See id §§ 85,99-104.
56. See id § 103; see also United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
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the integrity of the law itself. The right of judicial recourse in section 69
makes it abundantly clear that its aim is to act as a means of avoiding or
repairing instances of fundamental injustice. The procedure described in
section 45 is not as restrained because the adjudicatory process has not yet
gone to completion and the need to salvage it is not as strong. Even here,
however, judicial intervention is conditioned upon the substantial impact
of the arbitral detennination upon the rights of the parties. The
integration of substantive accountability into the regulatory regime
parallels the procedural accountability that is a traditional part of
legislative frameworks on arbitration. It operates with the same aim of
correcting the exceptionally gross or flagrant abuse of adjudicatory
authority.
The development of arbitration as a mainstream transborder and
commercial remedy, with a wider scope of application in the resolution of
civil and statutory disputes, makes the English tradition of judicial merits
supervision more desirable to the regulation of arbitration. Its desirability
is enhanced when the purpose of the procedure is aligned to the basic
ethic of the arbitral process-thereby making the objective of the appeals
procedure more remedial than regulatory. In the quest to corral arbitration
business, it also expresses the not insignificant view that the State remains
interested in the legitimacy of adjudicatory services (even private ones)
and that the demands of arbitral autonomy do not prohibit the imposition
of minimum standards of procedural and substantive accountability upon
arbitrators.
XVII. THE AWARD
The statutory section regulating the arbitral awards has all of the
positive attributes that are generally present in the statute. Selected
individual provisions warrant particular comment. For instance, section
46 states that the arbitral tribunal shall rule according to the law
designated by the parties or "such other considerations as are agreed by
them or determined by the tribunal."57 The open-ended recognition of
agreed-upon "considerations" demonstrates the malleability of the
requirement that the tribunal rule according to law and the strength of the
party autonomy principle. In effect, the arbitrating parties can decide to
empower the arbitrators to rule pursuant to whatever substantive predicate
of decision they choose. Moreover, they can authorize the tribunal to
modify the governing law in reaching its determination. The "other
57. See United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23, § 46(1)(b).
1997]
152 TULANE MARITIME LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
considerations" language invites the parties or the arbitrators (if so
authorized) to take trade usages and commercial customs into account in
resolving the dispute. If so stated in the agreement, flexible substantive
rulings become part of the bargain for arbitration. The rule effectively
accounts for the variegated circumstances of practice and implies some
recognition of amiable composition and equity arbitration.
XVIII. REMEDIES
Section 48 recognizes, subject to party amendment, that arbitrators
have the authority to issue declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory
relief. No mention is made of punitive or treble damages because that
issue is not as germane to English law as it is to United States arbitration
law. In an international arbitration involving a U.S. party and the
application of the U.S. statutory law that takes place in England perhaps
under the controlling authority of the 1996 Arbitration Act, the question
of the award of punitive or other forms of exemplary relief might arise.
In these circumstances, the parties should make an appropriate provision
in the arbitral clause or the submission. Otherwise, the question is not
provided for and may create difficulties either in the conduct of the
arbitral proceedings or in the enforcement of the award. The section also
contains extensive provisions on the awarding of interest,5 8 regulates the
impact of settlement on the arbitration,59 and articulates a comprehensive
and balanced framework of rules for withholding the award in the event
of the nonpayment of fees.6  Finally, the section provides that, as a
general matter, awards shall contain reasons unless the parties agree
otherwise or the award represents the parties' settlement of the matter.6'
XIX. MISCELLANEOUS
The statute contains an extensive set of provisions on the "[c]osts of
the arbitration, 62 reflecting its hybrid legislative and institutional
character and the importance it attributes to the practical operation of the
arbitral process. The role of judicial supervision in the enforcement of
arbitral awards 63 has been discussed earlier in relation to the commentary
58. See id. §49.
59. See id. § 51.
60. See id. § 56.
61. See id. § 52(4).
62. See id. §§ 59-65.
63. See id. §§ 66-71.
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on other provisions. Several additional observations, however, can
usefully be made.
Section 66(4) establishes that the statute does not affect the
enforcement of awards under parallel statutes or treaties.64 The remedial
options available to the court in the event of nonenforcement give it
leeway to sustain the arbitral process. Under the Act, the court can vary
the award, remit the award to the tribunal for reconsideration, set it aside
in whole or in part, enforce it in part, or declare the award of no effect. In
sections 68(3) and 69(7), the statute provides: "The court shall not
exercise its power to set aside or to declare an award to be of no effect, in
whole or in part, unless it is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to
remit the matters in question to the tribunal for reconsideration., 65 The
language makes transparent the regulatory philosophy that underlies the
enforcement of awards under the statute. In addition to the other
restrictions that have already been discussed, section 70 establishes other
limitations on the right to challenge the enforcement of an award,
including the requirement that other forms of relief be exhausted. The
other forms of relief can be internal to the arbitral process66 or external
and statutory.
67
Finally, there appears to be at least a facial contradiction between
section 70(4) and sections 45(1)-(2) and 69(1)-(2). The power of the
court to "order the tribunal to state the reasons for its award in sufficient
detail ' 68 to effectuate judicial review for purposes of enforcement is
inconsistent with the provision that "[a]n agreement to dispense with
reasons for the tribunal's award"69 amounts to a waiver of the court's
authority to determine a preliminary point of law or review "a question of
law arising out of an award. ' 70 The review contemplated under section
70(4) must be the scrutiny of the merits of an arbitral determination;
otherwise, there would not be any purpose for the court to order the
tribunal to either state reasons or elaborate upon them. The failure to
provide sufficiently elaborate rules perhaps explains the contradiction
between the various provisions. The apparent contradiction must arise
64. See id. §§ 99-104 (awards under the Geneva Convention or the New York Arbitration
Convention).
65. Id. §§ 68(3), 69(7).
66. Id. § 70(2)(a) ("any available arbitral process of appeal or review").
67. Id. § 70(2)(b) ("any available recourse under section 57 (correction of award or
additional awards)").
68. Id § 70(4).
69. Id § 69(1).
70. Id.
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from the different circumstances in which the tribunal can omit a
statement of reasons. If the tribunal failed to give reasons because it was
specifically authorized to do so by the parties' agreement, court
supervision is excluded and section 70(4) is inapplicable. If the tribunal
decided to forego giving reasons on its own because the party agreement
was silent on the matter, judicial review is not excluded and section 70(4)
can have its intended effect. This interpretation coincides with the
requirement in section 52(4) that awards be rendered with reasons unless
the award codifies a party settlement or the parties agree "to dispense with
reasons."'" The statute could have included additional language to clarify
this inter-textual confusion.
The remainder of the statutory provisions either have been discussed
previously or address relatively minor aspects of the arbitral process or
administrative details. It is significant that the statute nowhere explicitly
covers the question of subject matter inarbitrability, except for an elliptical
reference to consumer protection legislation in sections 89 and 90 and the
formalistic reference to the New York Arbitration Convention in section
103(3). It is difficult to understand why a statute that admits of judicial
review on questions of law and the merits does not treat an issue so
critical to the lawful jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. Perhaps the drafters
believed that other statutes would address the question of subject matter
inarbitrability on an individual basis.
XX. CONCLUSION
Despite some minor flaws, the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration
Act is an outstanding, indeed masterful, legislative framework on
arbitration. It embodies both depth and breadth; it is lucid, coherent, and
cohesive. It marries well the legislative and institutional regulation of
arbitration and brings the practical operation of the arbitral process to
center stage within the regulatory framework. The Act rehabilitates the
English tradition of substantive review by integrating it into a statutory
setting that unequivocally supports arbitration and understands the
gravamen of the process and its need for autonomy. The 1996 Arbitration
Act is a truly excellent law of arbitration, worthy of intemational
emulation.
71. Id. § 52(4).
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